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cifically affect the individual. Laskin J.A. would go so far as to allow
the arbitrator to use the specific facts of a case as background to interpretation and deny intervention as long as the arbitrator did not make
particular determinations. 50 Judson J. seems to accept this view,
Hall J. and apparently Cartwright J. do not.
If the direct result test were used, any submission to arbitration
could be drafted so skillfully that individuals would be refused the
right to intervene because their interests would not be 'particularly
determined'. Hall J. would allow the individual the right to intervene,
no matter in what form the issue was drawn, if in fact the proceeding
is 'aimed entirely' at him.5' This seems also to be the conclusion of
Cartwright J. where he states:
The reason that I differ from the result at which he Judson J. arrives is
that I am unable to regard the arbitration which was held as anything
other than an inquiry as to a single question, 52
that is whether or not the
employer was bound to discharge the appellant.
All the judges, including Wells J.A. and Hall J. admit the concept of the 'policy grievance', but as a result of this case there cannot
be many instances where an individual would be barred from intervening because the issue before the arbitrator is a 'policy grievance'.
The notion is, to all intents and purposes, a dead letter.
It will be interesting to see what effect this result will have on
the conduct of labour arbitrations. There is bound to be some confusion at first, but probably the snags can be sorted out without too
much difficulty. Hopefully, this inroad on the unions' exclusive bargaining rights can be restricted to the arbitration proceeding and not
to bargaining itself either at the negotiation of the agreement or at
grievance handling preliminary to arbitration. If problems arise which
threaten to inundate the usefulness of arbitration, the legislature
may have to be called to the rescue.
RODERICK G. FERGUSON.

Vana v. Tosta et al.
DAMAGES-DEATH OF A WIFE-MOTHER-FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT.

The question of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act' in the
case of the death of a wife and mother is the source of great interest
and confusion because the basis of the award and the items which may
50 See Bradley [1967] 2 O.R. 314, 315. Hoogendoorn [1967] 1 O.R. 712, 730.
51 65 D.L.R. 2d, at 648.
52 Id., at 642.
I R.S.O. 1950 c. 132.
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be claimed as damages are far from clear. Moreover, in comparison to
awards made in the case of the death of a husband and to awards in
2
the United States, damages given in Canada are very low.
The Supreme Court of Canada was recently presented with an
opportunity to clarify this area of the law and to raise the general
level of awards in this country. Although the Court did neither of
these things, the case of Vana v. Tosta et al.3 is of great importance
because the Court implied that certain principles should be followed in
assessing damages in fatal accident cases. It is the purpose of this paper
to examine these principles and to question their efficacy.
Under the Fatal Accidents Act compensation is to be awarded in
proportion to the injury resulting from death. 4 One of the main
problems is the question, to what injuries does the Act refer? The
courts have had difficulty in drawing the line between compensation
for the loss suffered as a result of the accident and compensation for
loss of consortium. Because the Act attempts to compensate for the
loss of future benefits which would have been received but for the
accident, the courts have had to consider any contingencies which may
reduce the future benefit. In doing this they have put what is felt to
be undue emphasis on these contingencies with the result that awards
have tended to be low in relation to the loss suffered. The combination
of these factors has given rise to the unfortunate result that damages
under the Act have not been based on any precise standard but
in many cases appear to be a convenient amount somewhere between
the minimum and the maximum award acceptable.
Before examining the Vana case it will be of benefit to review the
present basis of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, and the traditional method of computing the award as laid down by the courts. At
common law the wrongful death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury and no civil action could be brought. 5 The only
recourse against the wrongdoer was by criminal action. It was therefore to the wrongdoer's financial advantage to kill rather than maim.
Due to this inequity and the growing concern over the increased
deaths arising from the Industrial Revolution, Lord Campbell's Act
6
was passed in England and copied in many common law countries.
Under the Fatal Accidents Act a new independent right of action
is given to the near relatives of the deceased.7 While it is a right of
2 Compare, e.g.: Mogck v. Woldum, (1965) 52 D.L.R. 322; Stern v. Yasuna
N.Y. 741 (1964); DeBrincat v. Mitchell, (1958) 26 W.W.R. 634.
3 (1968) 66 D.L.R. 2d 97.
4 Supra, note 1, section 3.
5 Baker v. Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493; Osburn v. Gillett L.R. 8 Ex. 88.
6 Fatal Accidents Act 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., C. 93; Amended 1864, 27 & 28
Vict., c. 95 and 1908 Edw. VII, c. 7. First enacted in Canada in 1847, 10 & 11

Vict., c. 6.

7 Magill v. Moore (1919) 59 S.C. 9 at 11 per Anglin J.; "The statute gives
but one action to be brought by the personal representative, or in his default,
by one or more of the relatives of the class for whose benefit it may be
maintained. The cause of action is single; it is for the entire damage sustained by the whole class in whose behalf the statute provides that compensation may be recovered."
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action that the deceased did not have, section 2 of the present Act
makes it a condition precedent that the death must result from an
injury for which the deceased could have been compensated had he
lived. 8 In this respect then, contributory negligence and limitation
periods must be considered. 9 In applying the Act, the courts have
decided that the plaintiff can recover only financial or pecuniary loss.
A second condition precedent is thus introduced, namely that the
plaintiff must have lost a pecuniary benefit or a reasonable prospect of
financial advantage as a result of the death. The courts have further
decided that no amount will be allowed as solatium for the loss of
society of the wife, husband or parent.' 0 In other words the statute
has been interpreted as conferring a right to damage of the same
nature, in consequence of the death, as at common law could have
been recovered in the case of an injury which disabled but did not kill
the victim."
THE MATHEMATICS OF DEATH
In calculating the amount of damages it is well established that a
lump sum award will be made which, if not full compensation, is at
least fair compensation for the pecuniary loss suffered. 2 Pecuniary
loss is interpreted strictly but it is clear that it is not limited to monetary loss alone, as any service of value to the1 3relative which can be
translated into monetary terms is compensable.
To arrive at the proper amount of damages the courts first work
out what is called the "dependency".' 4 This may be defined as the
annual contribution of the deceased to the welfare of the relatives
who are claiming to have suffered as a result of the accident. In the
case of the death of a husband this is calculated by using his net income or take-home pay as the basis from which the damages are
8 Supra, note 1, section 2; see also Paul v. Chandler (1923) 54 O.L.R.
410; Littley v. Brooks (1932) S.C.R. 462. Blake v. Midland Rly. (1852) 18
Q.B.D. 93.
9 Whittington v. Middlesex, (1948) O.R. 419.
10 DeBrincat v. Mitchell, (1958) 26 W.W.R. 534 per Ruttan J. in the
Supreme Court of British Columbia at p. 635; "Pecuniary loss is the loss
of some benefit or advantage which is capable of being estimated in terms
of money as distinct from mere sentimental loss."
11 Supra, note 9.
12 Jones v. Tersigni (1930) 38 O.W.N. 315 per Kelly J., at 316; "An
attempt should not be made to give damages to the full amount of a perfect
compensation for pecuniary injury. A reasonable view should be taken of the
case so that there may be given what may be considered in all the circumstances a fair compensation."
13 Berry v. Humm & Co. (1915) 1 K.B. 627 per Scrutton J. at 631:
"I can see no reason in principle why such pecuniary loss should be
limited to the value of money lost, or the money value of things lost,
or contributions of food and clothing, and why I should be bound to
exclude the monetary loss incurred by replacing services rendered gratuitously by a relative, if there was a reasonable prospect of their being
rendered freely in the future but for the death."
14 Davies v. Powell Duffryn (1942) A.C. 601; Bishop v. Cunard (1950)
2 All E.R. 22; Bothwell v. Gallaway O.R. 377, aff'd (1951) O.R. 50.
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determined. Any expenditures the deceased normally would make
for his own maintenance are deducted. 15
The next step is to determine the number of years over which the
deceased might have continued to make this contribution. The courts
have calculated this by using a multiplier based on the joint-life
expectancy of the husband and wife as determined by actuarial
methods from the Canadian Life Tables. 16 The multiplier is not based
exclusively on these tables however, as the court is primarily interested in the period over which the contributions are made (i.e.
working-life expectancy) and the tables are based on average life
expectancy. Reductions or increases in the multiplier are made if
evidence is led which shows a likely departure from normal working
life. In some cases the courts have used a fixed multiplier which is
not based on age, health or the other factors normally used but is
merely an arbitrary figure. 17 Fortunately this practise is dying out
and it is doubtful that it would be employed by any Canadian courts
today.
Using the dependency and the multiplier a capital sum is then
calculated which provides an annual contribution over the estimated
number of years and which will be exhausted at the end of that
time. The capital sum is generally reduced to account for certain
contingencies which reduce the loss which the relatives have suffered.18
FACTS AND BACKGROUND OF VANA v. TOSTA

19

The case arose out of a collision between cars owned by George
Vana and Stanley Tosta. Tosta was a passenger in his own car which
was being negligently driven at the time by one Laxarewicz. The plaintiff's wife was killed, and he and his two children were injured. At the
time of the accident Vana was 47 years old and his wife was 37. The
two children, Nancy and Steven, were 13 and 10 respectively. According to actuarial evidence the joint life expectancy of the husband and
wife was 25 years. 20 Airs. Vana worked part time as a waitress and
brought in an estimated $30. a week to the household of which $200. a
year was put into a bank account towards the education of the children. As the husband earned $93. a week, the money earned by her was
of assistance in maintaining the family. After the accident, the plaintiff's mother, a 75 year old widow, kept house for Vana. He had promised to pay her $30. a week but, because of the expenses of the accident,
he had been unable to pay her anything as of the date of the trial. In
Davies v. Powell Duffryn (1942) A.C. 601 per Lord Wright at 605.
Canadian Life Table is published by the Queen's Printer, Ottawa every
few years and is used by the courts to establish normal life expectancies.
17 See Bishop v. Cunard White Star Ltd. (1950) 2 All E.R. 22.
18 Canadian courts have occasionally used contingencies to reduce the
multiplier rather than the capital sum. See Ponyicky v. Sawyama, (1943)
S.C.R. 197.
15

16

19 Supra, note 3.

20 The husband's life expectancy was 26.7 years and his wife's was 40.28

years.
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addition he could receive assistance by way of guidance from his 62
year old mother-in-law.
This table indicates the damages awarded by the trial and the
appellate courts under the Fatal Accident Act.
Court
Trial
Ontario Court of Appeal21
Supreme Court of Canada 22

Vana
$20,000
10,000
14,435

Award
Nancy
$10,000
2,000
4,000

Steven
$5,000
1,500
3,000

There are two major aspects to this case, which should be dealt
with separately. The first consideration is the basis of compensation
to be paid to a husband for the loss of his wife. The second concerns
the basis of compensation to be paid to children for the loss of their
mother.
WIFE
Valuation of the loss in the case of death of a wife is a problem
because two conflicting, or apparently conflicting, principles cause confusion as to what should be awarded. The first principle is set out in
Berry v. Humm c Co. which held that damages are not limited to the
value of money lost but include the value of loss of services as well. 23
The second principle is exemplified by a statement of Barrow . in
Galagherv. CanadaCoack Lines Ltd. et a7.:
"The law is settled that compensation cannot be allowed
for mental
anguish and suffering or for the loss of a wife's society."24
The judiciary has been overcautious in drawing the line between
these two principles and, hence, has failed to draw any definitive line
at all.
One of the results of the distinction between loss of services and
loss of consortium is confusion over the proper basis for calculating
damages for loss of services. The term "pecuniary loss" suggests some
relationship to out-of-pocket expenses and the courts have vacillated
between this principle and the replacement cost as the proper basis for
calculating damages. This confusion was finally resolved by the Supreme Court in the Vana cases in favour of replacement cost as the
proper basis of the award.
In the Ontario High Court, Haines J. emphasized the value of a
wife's services to her husband. 25 He pointed out that very often it
would take two servants to replace a wife as the person who would
undertake the menial tasks of housework is rarely suited to discharge
21 Vana v. Tosta (1964) 45 D.L.R. 2d 574.
22 Vana v. Tosta et aZ. (1966) 54 D.L.R. 2d 15.
23

Supra, note 15.

24 (1945) O.W.N. 202 at 203.

25 Supra, note 2 at 577: "It is difficult to estimate the cash value of
the wife-mother's services, but one need not be a home economist to
appreciate their worth. They are and must be worth considerable, even after
making the necessary deductions because the plaintiff would not have to
clothe the wife-mother substitute nor give her pocket money."
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the more exacting duties such as home management and the education
and training of children. 26 With these principles in mind he then based
his award on an estimate of the cost of replacing certain of those
services which are performed by the wife as well as on the loss of income from the part time job. The factors, aside from income, which
he relied on were:
1. The expense of employing a housekeeper and perhaps a person to care for the children.
2. The expense of providing room and board for these employees.
3. The expense of providing for the countless services rendered by a wife which are not provided by employees. The approach
taken by Mr. Justice Haines is one which should have been approved
by the higher courts. The only possible criticism is that he might have
shown how he arrived at the final award with more precision and in
greater detail.
The Court of Appeal adopted the position that replacement cost
is not the prime consideration, but that compensation under the statute
is limited to what may be called, out-of-pocket expenses. The Court
felt that any attempt to go further would be to enter the realm of
compensation for loss of consortium and this was to be avoided at
all costs. In reducing the award, the Court considered the fact that the
plaintiff did not intend to hire a housekeeper as these services were
being provided by Vana's mother at a rate of $30. a week. Moreover,
it felt that there was insufficient evidence as to the cost of providing
board and lodging for employees. It was felt that this would prove less
than maintaining a wife. The court then adopted the position that all
mitigating factors would be given full weight and the plaintiff must
prove without doubt every item of monetary loss.
The majority in the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and reverted to the principle of replacement cost as espoused by Mr. Justice Haines. Spence J. noted that a
tortfeasor cannot claim the benefit of services donated to the injured
party, such as the housekeeping of the mother in the present case.
Having adopted replacement cost as the basis of valuation the Court
should have gone on to calculate the damages on this basis. However,
this was not done and we are given no precise statement as to what
items are to be included in the award.
This failure is perhaps less the fault of the Supreme Court than it
is the fault of counsel in fatal accident cases. Canadian lawyers are
much more reluctant to present expert evidence as to the cost of replacing services rendered by a wife than are their counterparts in the
United States. In the Vana case the only evidence as to the cost of
hiring a housekeeper was hearsay evidence given by the plaintiff himself. No evidence was given as to the cost of employing a mother substitute although Haines J. in the trial court specifically asked counsel
if they had evidence as to this expense. Perhaps now that replacement
cost is established as the proper basis of the award, lawyers will pre26

Id., at 576.
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sent expert evidence to a greater degree and Canadian awards will
reflect the true loss suffered by the husband.
A second issue raised by the case is what portion of the wife's
income is to included in the award as having been a benefit to the
husband and family? The Court of Appeal noted that as the wife's
earnings were being paid in advance they must be discounted as any
number of factors could have curtailed or reduced this income. Moreover, the wife's actual contribution to the household is unknown because of insufficient evidence as to what she spent on herself. The point
made by the Court is that the husband cannot have lost anything of
benefit if the wife used the salary for her own maintenance. To decide
what portion of the income should be included as compensation, the
joint income of the husband and wife is determined and the amount
spent on maintaining the wife is deducted.
The amount which must be added to the husband's income to total
the remaining money from the joint account is what should be included in the award. In many cases the husband will have more of his
own income left after the wife's maintenance is deducted than he
would have had the accident not occurred. This is adjusted once the
replacement cost of the services provided gratuitously by the wife
is added.
A third issue is the effect of contingencies on awards under the
Fatal Accidents Act. Because the court is attempting to award one
amount for all damages which could result from the accident they
have adopted the principle of reducing the capital sum to account for
factors which may reduce the loss of which may have reduced the
benefit to the relatives. A word should be added here concerning the
onus of proof with regard to contingencies. Normally, the onus is on
the party for whose benefit an allegation is made. This is not so in
the case of fatal accidents. The court presumes that all contingencies
apply and the burden is on the plaintiff to rebut such contingencies.
Moreover, the burden is very heavy and it is likely that even if evidence is given to rebut the presumption the effect will be merely to
reduce the effect of the contingency and not to nullify it entirely.
In Vana the trial judge made little mention of contingencies except to note that, in his opinion, remarriage was unlikely. The Court of
Appeal seized upon this fact and used it to reduce the award drastically. The dissenting opinion of Ritchie J. in the Supreme Court agreed
almost entirely with the Court of Appeal on this issue. He notes:
"I agree with the Court of Appeal that the learned trial judge erred in
principle in including in his award factors which cannot properly be
classified as2pecuniary loss and that he failed to allow for the contingencies of life." 7
The Supreme Court modified the accepted view of the effect of
contingencies in its majority judgment as Spence J. warned against
giving too much weight to contingencies in reducing the award.
27

Supra, note 3 at page 104.
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The major contingency reducing awards in Canadian courts is the
possibility of remarriage. Upon remarriage the court assumes that no
further loss occurs as a result of the death of the first wife. This item
has taken on major proportions in Canada and it is rare that remarriage is not considered imminent within a few years of the death
of the first wife. Moreover, the effect of this contingency is to reduce
the multiplier used and not simply the capital sum, so the effect is a
drastic reduction of the damages. The presumption has proved to be
almost irrebuttable although the court does take into consideration
the age, health, religion and financial circumstances of the plaintiff
as well as the number of dependent children he has to support. The
court does not usually consider the possibility that the second wife
will not prove to be as good a wife and mother as the first. If this was
the case damages would presumably be reduced but not eliminated on
remarriage. Also, it would seem fair that if the court is to assume remarriage, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover damages for the
expense of courting and marrying his second wife, expenses that he
would not have had to face, but for the accident.
In the Vana case -the trial judge found remarriage unlikely but
the Court of Appeal said there was no evidence to support this assumption.28 This shows the heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff to rebut
this contingency. The majority in the Supreme Court considered that
the trial judge was in the best position to decide whether remarriage
was likely or not and his finding that it was unlikely amounted to
more than a personal opinion and was an opinion which should have
been accepted by the Court of Appeal. Plaintiffs may benefit from the
conclusion of the court that the possibility of remarriage should not
be given too much weight in arriving at the amount to be awarded. 29
It is not clear from Mr. Justice Spence's decision whether this is to be
taken as a general principle or whether it was merely a comment on
the decision of the lower court. Whatever the intention of the judge,
possibility of reducing the contingency should be welcomed by the
profession at large. As the court points out, there are many eventualities to be taken into account before the court can decide whether remarriage is likely or not, and it should not be an automatic assumption. 30
Hence, Vana v. Tosta can be viewed as an aid in determining the
value of a wife for purposes of the Fatal Accidents Act because of two
important principles adopted by the majority in the Supreme Court.
The first and most important is that replacement cost is adopted as the
proper basis of valuation for services provided by the wife. Secondly,
contingencies should not be given too much weight, especially where
the evidence does not warrant such emphasis.
28 The court pointed out that he has a good job and his injuries would
not preclude remarriage.
29 Supra, note 3 at page 112.
30 The age, religion, physical condition, financial status, and the number
of children he has to support are only a few of these factors.
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MOTHER
The second area opened up by the Vana case is that of compensation to children for the loss of their mother. The leading Canadian case
on the subject is St. Lawrence and Ottawa Railway Co. v. Lett.3 1 In
this case "injury" under the FatalAccidents Act was defined as meaning substantial loss as opposed to sentimental loss and substantial loss
was not to be confined to a pecuniary interest. As Ritchie C.J. pointed
out, the statute does not use the term pecuniary and so, such a narrow
and confining term should not be read into the statute.32 He stated
that, in the case of the death of a mother, compensation should be
awarded for:
"The greatest injury it is possible to conceive a child can sustain, namely,
in being deprived of the care, education and training of a mother."33
The dissent in this case expressed the fear that because these
services are neither procured nor procurable with money they are not
susceptible to having a pecuniary value attached to them. To
attempt to do so would result in highly speculative awards. 34 In spite
of this fear however, the Lett case has been followed and approved
35
almost without exception throughout Canada.
Mr. Justice Haines echoed the Lett decision when he stated that:
"In their mental, moral, and physical development they were entitled to
the assistance and guidance of both parents. Now they have only one, and
I consider the loss 36
of their mother one of the greatest losses these children could sustain."
It is evident that Haines J. has strong views with respect to
damages under these circumstances. At page 62 of the Examinationin-Chief of George Vana he observed:
"I have very definite views in respect of this in fatal accident claims ...
It does seem to me that we have overlooked one thing, it is logical to have
the advantage of mother love for the care and guidance of children, something we have avoided . . .I am quite prepared to blaze new trails in

that direction. It does seem to me there is very often a real losg in the
absence of guidance. The understanding given a child by a mother, the
guidance which assists development, the judgment, all those things,
surely have a value and I think you will find the sociologists tell us that
a proper mother
37 substitute requires constant training. This is not loss
of consortium."

Haines J. then asked whether counsel had inquired at various
social services into what it would cost to hire someone to render the
(1885) 11 S.C.R. 422.
32 Supra, note 3 per Ritchie C.J. at 426.
33 Id., at page 432.
34 Supra footnote 3 per Gwynne J. at 445.
35 The Lett case has been followed and approved in: Tarasoff v. Zeilinski
(1921) 59 D.L.R. 177; Agnew v. Ellen (1936) 3 W.W.R. 337; Dunnette v.
Northumberland (1937) O.W.N. 29; Johnson v. Sorochuk (1941) 2 D.L.R. 773;
Ponyicky v. Sawayama (1943) 1 D.L.R. 165; Walker v. Bedard (1945)
O.W.N. 120; Gallagher v. Canada Coach Lines (1945) O.W.N. 202; Wallis v.
Lichty (1952) O.W.N. 116; DeBrincat v. Mitchell (1958) 26 W.W.R. 634;
Hossack v. Hertz (1966) S.C.R. 28.
36 Supra, note 21 at 577.
37 Quoted from the appellant's factum. p. 62 of the Examination in
Chief of George Vana.
31
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services of a mother. Thus, it is quite apparent that Haines J. was
concerned with discovering the replacement value of a mother and
it was on his estimate of this value he based his award to the
children.
The Court of Appeal purported to overrule the Lett case although
it had been followed repeatedly in Canada.38 MacKay J. pointed out
that English courts have not adopted the principle of compensation to
children for the loss of the care and guidance of a mother. He felt
that the Lett case was based on an improper interpretation of English
cases. 39 While the Court of Appeal appeared to be unilaterally attempting to overthrow the principles of stare decises and declare a decision
of the Supreme Court poor law, Mr. Justice MacKay did express the
hope that this problem might again come before the Supreme Court
for consideration.
In considering the question of damages to the children, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the Lett decision in very precise language.40 Unfortunately, from a jurisprudential point of view, the court
did not say whether it considered the Lett case binding on the Supreme
Court or whether it was followed because it is a good decision in principle and one which the Court wished to apply for that reason.
Significantly, the Supreme Court dismissed the necessity of finding a moderate sum 41 as damages in such cases. The Court of Appeal
was concerned with these damages becoming unduly generous. The
Supreme Court pointed out that an award based on all the circumstances existing at the date of the accident could avoid excessive
damages without necessarily adopting the principle of nominal damages for the substantial loss of a mother. The Supreme Court then
concluded that the amount awarded by the Court of Appeal was a
purely "conventional figure" was not based on the evidence and was,
therefore, wrong in principle.42 At the same time, Spence J. held that
the trial judge's assessment was "inordinately high and amounted to
a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages." 43 The Court then chose
a figure double the amount awarded by the Court of Appeal.
Surely this award must be subject to the same "conventional
assessment" charge which the Supreme Court made against the Court
of Appeal. The problem is that while the Court has decided that the
children's loss is substantial it has not decided how to evaluate this
loss. The husband can recover as replacement cost the value of such
mother substitutes as he has to employ. The children have no such
expense. Moreover, the courts have decided that actual emotional
Supra, note 35.
Supra, note 22, see especially pages 21, 25, and 27.
Supra, note 3 per Spence J. at p. 185: "Despite anything that was
said in Grand Trunk Railway or comments made in the Australian and New
Zealand cases the decision of this court in St. Lawrence is unaffected and
remains good law in Canada."
41 Id., at 116 see also Benham v. Gambling (1941) A.C. 157.
42 Id., at 117.
43 Id., at 116.
38

39
40

134
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suffering is not recoverable because this is loss of consortium.
Clearly the loss of the care and guidance of a mother is a substantial loss to the children. This should be especially so today
when we have a more complete understanding of child psychology
than we did at the time of the Lett decision. The purpose of the Fatal
Accidents Act is to compensate for injuries resulting from the death
of a near relative. It is submitted that it is almost impossible to assess
this loss. What is needed is a statutory minimum to be awarded to
each child on the basis of age, sex, and the sex of the deceased parent.
For example, a girl will suffer more from the loss of a mother than
would a boy of the same age, and yet a boy of two or three years
would suffer more as a result of the loss of his mother than a girl
of ten or twelve. The award should be based on minimum rather
that maximum amounts because the court should have a discretion
to award any amount it sees fit if there is evidence to support the
extra claim. Some American jurisdictions have adopted this method
and it would seem to be the best solution to the problem.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
The Vana case must be considered as a disappointing judgment.
The case arose in such a manner that the whole question of damages
in fatal accident cases was open to review.45 The Court chose not to
deal with the case in this manner however, and simply affirmed the
Lett case and chose a neutral amount of damages half-way between
the damages proposed by the trial court and the amount assessed by
the Court of Appeal. This is a continuation of the "numbers game"
so beloved by jurists and legislators alike," and bears no real relationship to the damages actually suffered as a result of the accident.
Part of the blame for the uncertainty in this area can be
directed by the draftsmanship of that Act itself as no statutory
definition is provided as to what damages are to be allowed. All we
are told is that "such damages may be awarded as are proportioned to
the injury resulting from such death." 47 No definition of "injury"
is provided and so it has been left to the courts to determine what is
meant by this term. The Canadian courts, following the English
example, have decided that the injury referred to in the statute is
44 It is of interest to note that under present law in DeBrincat v.
Mitchell (1958) 26 W.W.R. 634 at 636 the court disallowed a claim for extra
damages to a boy who was shown to be suffering great emotional shock as
this was regarded as being a loss of consortium.
45 This is due partly to Haines J's liberal approach to the question but
is mainly due to the narrow view taken by the C.A.
46 An example of this is provided in the present case. We are told by
the Supreme Court that the amount to be allowed for the loss of the care
and guidance of a mother is to be increased to $2,000 for the girl and $1,000
for the boy. The mother also saved $200 a year for education of the children.
Assuming ten years of such savings, as does the trial judge and, we assume,
the Supreme Court this means that a sum of $1,000 per child plus interest
is available for their education. Yet the Supreme Court awarded each child
$1,000 more than this figure and we are left with no rational basis for the
award except for the gnawing suspicion that the award was calculated by
doubling the figure awarded by the Court of Appeal.
47 Supra, note 1, section 3(1) of the Act.
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pecuniary loss and that no amount should be allowed for pain and
suffering or for the loss of the society of the deceased. Assuming that
this is a proper course of action, the courts should then have decided
what losses are pecuniary and on what basis the amount of damages
will be calculated.
If it can be said that the courts have attempted to do this at
all, it is evident from the Vana case that this has been done in a very
imprecise manner. Admittedly, the Supreme Court impliedly affirms
the view that the proper basis on which to calculate damages should
be the replacement cost. What is now required, especially in the
case of the wrongful death of married women, is a judicial definition
of what services are to be compensated on this basis. 48 The plaintiff
could then submit expert evidence of the replacement cost of these
services at the time of the accident. In arriving at the final assessment the court should set out how much it is allowing for each
item of pecuniary loss. Total damages may then be calculated on
the basis of the length of time these services could be expected to
be rendered. 49 Such a method of calculating damages should result
in more accurate and, hence, fairer awards.
The courts have adopted the principle of reducing the lump sum
damages to allow for. contingencies which cannot be foreseen with
certainty at the time of the trial. While this is sound in principle
the method of implementation is again vague and imprecise. The
Vana case states that excessive weight must not be given to these
contingencies. This is an improvement. Formerly they had a drastic
diminishing effect on awards in Canada. A more serious complaint,
however, is that seldom do the courts define what contingencies
they take into account and, hence, it is even more seldom that any
precise reduction is clearly attributable to these contingencies. 50 The
problem is that, no matter on what basis the contingencies are estimated, they can never be more than a calculated guess. A solution
might be the abandonment of the lump sum award in favour of periodic payments based on the principles used in alimony cases. This
would allow for a reduction or curtailment of the award if circumstances change to warrant a revision of the award, such as on the
remarriage of the husband or wife. 51 Some contingencies, of course,
48 Flynme "Damages-Deaths of Wives and Ckildren in the Culture
Today (1966) 38 N.Y.S.B.J. 241. The article quotes an article in AamPimAx
Homm MAGAZImE Jan. '59 which sets out various services performed by a
wife and values her services at $193.95 per week on a replacement cost
basis.
49 The multiplier will vary with each individual item, depending on
the nature and character of the services.
50 Supra note 3, per Spence J. at 114 "After reviewing the evidence and
giving due weight to the possibility of remarriage, remote as it may be, and
what it will cost to hire a housekeeper and the other factors involved, I
have reached the conclusion that an award of $14,000 should be made." This
statement purports to tell all but really tells us nothing. We do not know
what other factors he is referring to nor what amount was allowed for

th6 factors he does mention.

51 Waldron v. Rural Municipality of Elfros (1922) 3 W.W.R. 1227. Here

the jury awarded damages of $500 a year to the widow until death or remarriage. The Court of Appeal said this type of award exceeded their powers
and damages had to be reassessed.
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cannot be accounted for in this manner as they relate to changes
which might have occurred had the deceased not been in the accident.
These must be accounted for in a lump sum award and, if approached
in a reasonable manner and taking all the circumstances into account,
a percentage reduction in the award would be justified.
The Fatal Accidents Act purports to compensate for injuries
resulting to near relatives of the deceased as a result of the accident.
There is no justification for the preoccupation of the courts with
pecuniary loss. It is settled that a husband may recover for the loss
of consortium when his wife is incapacitated by an accident and he
may recover for pain and suffering when he himself is injured. Why
then is there a distinction between these cases and the case where
the husband loses his wife forever? McDonald C.J.B.C. pointed out
in a decision of the B.C. Supreme Court that:
"Probably the distinction turns on the theory that a bereaved husband
may 52remarry, whereas, if his wife is incapacitated but living, he cannot."
This explanation does not preclude damages for loss of consortium
where the husband does not remarry, nor does it explain why he
cannot recover for loss of consortium during the period between
the accident and remarriage. Moreover, the American judiciary
has adopted the attitude that a spouse may recover for loss of
consortium. This seems to be working out very well, in spite of the fact
that very substantial awards are given in many cases.5 3 The U.S.
position is well stated in Spangler v. Helm's New York Pittsburgh
Motor Express where the court remarked: "All these things such as
companionship, society, guidance, solace, and protection which go
into the vase of family happiness are things for which a wrongdoer
54
must pay when he shatters the vase."
In conclusion the law concerning damages under the Fatal
Accidents Act is vague, imprecise, and unjust. The case of Vana v.
Tosta does little to remedy this situation. The contributions made by
this case are three in number. In the first place, replacement cost is
now the proper basis for calculating damages for loss of services.
Secondly, contingencies should not be given too mueh weight in
calculating damages. Finally, it is now clear that children can
recover for the loss of the care and guidance of a mother.
C. D. WILSON.*

Ponyicky v. Sawayama (1942) 3 W.W.R. 719 at 722.
Legare v. United States 195 F. Supp. 577; Here the court awarded
$150,000 for the death of a mother of six children, including $25,000 for the
loss of consortium.
54 553A (2d) 490 at 492.
* C. D. Wilson, B.A. (Manitoba), LL.B. (Osgoode Hall Law School), is a
member of the 1968 graduating class.
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